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[1] Labor-Collective Bargaining Contracts-Arbitration.-A disput.· between !l corporation engaged ill inter~ta tc eOllllllerce and
a Inbor union as to wheth~'r the collective bargaining contract
b('tween them cove.rs the eillployees of a wholly owned corporate
sllbliidiary (a180 engngeu in interstate COl1llllerce) i~ not beyond
the jurisdiction of an arbitrator, or of the ~tate courts in an
action for contirmntion of the arbitrator's awnrd, on the ground
thnt it involves qu~stions of "representation" nnd "appropriate
bargaining unit" which federal law (29 U.S.C. § 159) assigns
exclusively to the Xatiullal Labor R .. lations Board, or on the
ground that an erroneoll~ decision of that issue would compel
the parties to apply the contract to the subsidiary's employees
in violation of 29 U.S.C. ~ 1;')S, ddining unfair labor practices.
[2] Id.-Collective Bargaining Contracts-Arbitration.-Where an
arbitrator's awal'll construing a collective barg'aining contract
between a union nnd n corporlltion holds that the contract
covers the elllploy('e~ of a wholly owned corporate subsidiary,
the subsidiary, thou~h not n party to the arbitration proceeding, is entitled to challelJge its legality, since enforcement of the
award against thc parent corplH'ntion would affect the subsidiary's dealings with its ('Illployt··,·s.
[3] Id.-Collective Bargaining Contracts-A',:bitration.-An arbitrator's award, construing a collective bargaining contract
between a union and a corporation, nlld holding that the
contrnct applies to the employees of a wholly owned corporate
subsidiary, dcnies due proc('>;s of law to the subsidiary wherc
the latter was not a party to the arbitration proceeding, did not
have notice of or consent thereto, was not a party to the
collective bargaining contrnct 01' to the submission to arbitration, and where the union did not establish that the subsidiary
was the alter ego of the parent ('orpol'ation.

APPEAL.from a ju<1gmcnt of thi; Superior Court of Los
Angeles County connrmin::r all arbitration award. Macklin
Fleming, Judge. ReV{,I'RCd will! dircdions.
[1) Matters arbitrable under arhitration provisions of collective
labor contract, note, 24 A.L.R.2d i;,)2. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Labor,
§ 63 et seq.; Am.Jur., Labor (I'('V cd § 113 et seq).
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Labor, § Sa.
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TRAYNOR, J .-Retail Clerks Union, Local 770 brought
this action under Code of Civil Procedure section 1287 (now
§ 1285) for confirmation of an arbitrator's award. Customers
Finance Company (doing business and hereinafter referred
to as MORE) was granted leave to intervene in the confirD:\ation proceedings. Thriftimart and MORE appeal from
the judgment confirming the award on the grounds that the
award invades the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board and denies MORE due process of law.
Thriftimart operates about 60 retail food stores in the Los
Angeles area. The collective bargaining agreement between
it and Local 770 expressly applies to " all locations" of
Thriftimart.
In May 1961 Thriftimart procured the incorporation of The
W.1.T. Company with an authorized capital stock of 20,000
shares, of which 18,660 were issued. The W.1.T. Company
then exchanged all of its issued stock for 67,854 shares of
Thriftimart stock. W.1. T. in turn exchanged the Thriftimart
stock for the physical assets of Consumers Finance Company.
As a result of these transactions, Thriftimart owns all of the
issued stock ofW.1. T., W.1. T. owns the assets of Customers
Finance Company (consisting of four discount department
stores), and Customers Finance Company owns 67,854 shares
of Thriftimart stock. Thereafter, Customers Finance Company transferred its corporate name and its trade name
(MORE) to W.1.T. It is the new MORE that is involved
in this action.
After these transactions were carried out, Local 770 asserted that the collective bargaining agreement between it and
Thriftimart covered certain employees of MORE. Thriftimart disputed that contention, but agreed with Local 770 to
submit to arbitration (1) the question of arbitrability; (2)
the issue on the merits: "Does the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the Employer and the Union, by its terms,
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apply to and cover employees of ... MORE, employed in the
appropriate classifications covered by the said contract and
within the territorial area of the union, because of its acquisition by Thriftimart ~" . Thriftimart reserved the right
to move to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that the substantive issue was not arbitrable.
The contract provided that questions of arbitrability
"shall be determined in the first instance by the arbitrator
and broadly committed to arbitration "any and all
matters of controversy, dispute or disagreement of any kind
or character existing between the parties and arising out of
or in any way involving the interpretation or application of
t h IS A greement.... "
The arbitrator found the issue arbitrable. On the merits,
the arbitrator found it "clear from the ... contract ° •• that
the parties intended the contract to apply to any new location ° .' 0" and that l\10RE's stores were such "new locations" within the meaning of the contract.
[1] We are faced at the outset with the contention that
neither this court nor the arbitrator has jurisdiction of this
dispute since it involves questions of "representation" and
"appropriate bargaining unit" assigned by the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §141 et seq.) exclusively to
the National Labor Relations Board. (See 29 U~S.C. § 159.)
Since both Thriftimart and MORE are engaged in interstate commerce, this litigation is within the purview of section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act. (29
U.S.C. § 185 (a).) The cases cited for the board's exclusive
jurisdiction are not persuasive in view of the recent decision
by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Evening
News Assn. (1962) 371 U.s. 195 [83S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246].
In that case an employee brought an action against his employer for damages resulting from the latter's alleged violation of a collective bargaining agreement. The trial court sustained the employer's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the allegations, if true, would make
out an unfair labor practice and that therefore the subject
matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the preemption doctrine did not apply to cases arising
under collective bargaining agreements, even though "the alleged conduct of the employer . . . concededly, is an unfair
labor practice within the jurisdiction of the National Labor
•

0

."

o

)

)

423

424

RETAIL

CLERKS UNION

V.

THRIFTIMART,

INC.

[59 C.2d

Relations Board. The authority of the board to deal with an
unfair labor practice which also violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive
and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts under
§ 301." (83 S.Ot. at pp. 268-269 [9 L.ed.2d at p. 249]. See
Local 174, Teamsters, etc. of America v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9 [82 S.Ot. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593, 598];
Cha1'les Dowd Box Co. v. Court.ney, 368 U.S. 502, 504 [82
S.Ot. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483, 485] ; Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 [82 S.Ot. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462] ; Sovern,

)

\
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Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76
H,arv. L. Rev. 529, 532-544 (1963).)
The cases upon which Thriftimart and MORE rely (Local
1505, International Brotherhood etc. AFL-CIO v. Local
Lodge 1836, Intl. Assn. of Machinists, 304 F.2d 365, cert.
granted, 371 U.S. 908 [82 S.Ct. 255, 9 L.Ed.2d 169];
Local' 1357, Retail Olerks Intl. Assn. v. Food Fair
Stores, Inc., 202 F.Supp. 322; International Ohemical
Workers Union, Local 6 v. Olin Mathieson Ohemical Oorp.,
202 F.Supp. 363; and International Union of Doll & Toy
Workers v. Metal Polishers, etc., AFL-OIO, 180 F.Supp. 280),
were decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v.
Evening N ewsAssn., supra, and rest upon the premise,
squarely rejected in the latter case, that the parties could not
by private agreement oust or limit the jurisdiction of the
board. The Supreme Court, however, recognizes the jurisdiction of both the courts and the board. (371 U.S. 195 [83
S.Ot. at p. 269, 9 L.Ed.2d at p. 249].)
It is nevertheless contended that the Smith case recognizes
judicial competence to decide contract actions that involve ...-----.---past unfair labor practices only, but does not authorize
courts to make determinations that involve the risk of compelling the commission of unfair labor practices. It is urged
that arbitrators and courts are not competent to determine
whether the Thriftimart-Local 770 c·ollective bargaining contract applies to MORE, for an erroneous decision of that issue would compel the parties to apply the collective bargaining contract to MORE's employees in violation of section 8
of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 158).
(See Masters-Lake Success, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 580.) We are
not persuaded that the United States Supreme Oourt would
make the suggested distinction. Bargaining unit issues are
commonly provided for in collective bargaining contracts and
are therefore commonly adjudicated by arbitrators (see Cum-
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mings, NLRB Jurisdiction and Labor Arbitration: "Uniformity" vs. "Industrial Peace," 12 Labor Law Journal 425,
429) ; national labor policy favors the settlement of labor disputes by arbitration (United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 [SO 8.Ct. 152, 4 L.Ed.2d lIS]); and an
erroneous decision in a contract action involving a past unfair
labor practice may result in the continued commission of that
practice. Accordingly, we hold that the court's jurisdiction
to decide contract actions (Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
supra; McCarroll v. Los Angeles County etc. Carpenters, 49
Cal.2d 45, 60 [315 P.2d 322]) is not displaced by the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board to remedy unfair labor practices (29 U.S.C. § 160) or to designate appropriate bargaining units (29 U.S.C. § 159).
[2] The validity of MORE '8 contention that the decision
of the arbitrator in a proceeding to which it was not a party
and without notice to or consent by MORE is a denial of due
process 'of law depends on whether the arbitrator's award affects MORE. In an attempt to forestall adjudication of this
issue, Local 770 "concedes that the judgment in its present
form applies to and can be enforced only against the party
Thriftimart." It is obvious, however, that enforcement of the
award against Thriftimart would be enforcement against
MORE, for the award provides that the contract between
Thriftimart and Local 770 covers MORE and its employ-·
ees. In this regard, it is significant that Local 770 is now seeking to compel specific enforcement of the award in another
action.· Thus, through proceedings nominally directed
against Thriftimart alone, Local 770 seeks to affect MORE's
dealings with its employees. The source of Local 770 's asserted power to affect MORE is the arbitration proceeding to
which MORE was not a party. Accordingly,1\10RE may
properly challenge the legality of that proceeding.
[3] The question is one of federal law. (Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 44S [77 8.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d
972] ; Local 174, Teamsters, etc. of America v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95, 102 [S2 8.Ct. 571,7 L.Ed.2d 593, 59S].) Local 770
contends that the Steelworkers cases ( United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 [SO S.Ct. 152, 4 L.Ed.2d.
lIS] ; United Steelworkers v. Warrior ill Gulf N. Co., 363 U.S.
*The action was stayed as premature on Thriftimart's petition for a
writ of mandate. Thriftimart, Inc. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal.App.2d
421 [21 Cal.Rptr. 19].
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574 [80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409]; United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise nTlwel & Cat" Corp., 363 U.S. 593 [80 S.Ct.
1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424]) compel confirmation of the award
and prohibit judicial review of both the issue of arbitrability
and the merits of the award. This argument overlooks the
premise upon which those cases rest: the consensual nature
of arbitration. "Arbitration is a matter of contract and a
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any d,ispute
which he has not agreed so to submit.... The judicial inquiry
... must be strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree
to give the arbitrator power to make the award he made."
(363 U.S. at pp. 582-583 [4 L.Ed.2d 1417].)
In the Steelworkers cases, the Supreme Court sought to insulate consensual labor arbitration from judicial intervention.
The arbitrator's decision on the merits is not to be disturbed,
c, even through the back door of interpreting the arbitration
clause. ~ . " (363 U.S. at p. 585 [4 L.Ed.2d 1419]), for it was
the arbitrator's judgment of what the parties agreed to that
was bargained for. In the present case, however, MORE was
not a party to the collective bargaining contract and did not
join in the submission of the controversy to the arbitrator.
Thus, the crucial issue is whether there can be a valid arbitration award in the absence of a party directly affected by the
award. The substantive federal law of collective bargaining
agreements affords no solution to this question. "Until it is
elaborated by the federal courts we assume it does not differ
significantly from our own law." (McC.aJrroll v. Los Angeles
County etc. Carpenters, 49 Ca1.2d 45, 60 [315 P.2d 32~J.)
In Retail Clerks Local 428 v. L. Bloom Sons Co., 173 Cal.
App.2d 701 [344P.2d 51J, the union sought tocompel ___ ~_~_. _________ _
L. Bloom Sons to arbitrate whether their collective bargaining
contract applied to "Bloom's Salinas, Inc.," which the union
claimed was being operated by L. Bloom Sons. In that case 88
in this one the union did not establish that the subsidiary was
the alter ego of the parent corporation as a prerequisite to
enforcing the parent's agreement against the subsidiary.
"The proper forum for that determination is, of course, a
court of law." (173 Cal.App.2d at p. 703; Minton v. Oa1Janey, 56 Ca1.2d576, 579, 581 [15 Cal.Rptr. 641, 364 P.2d
473] ; Motores De Mexicali, S.A. v. Superior Oourt, 51 Ca1.2d
172, 176 [3~1 P.2d 1].) The court affirmed dismissal of the
union's petition on the ground that Bloom's Salinas, Inc.
, was an indispensable party. "Appellant contends that the is-
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sue must be determined by the arbitrator because it involves a
controversy arising out of the contract .... It is conceded that
respondent and Bloom '8 Salinas, Inc., are separately incorporated. Bloom's Salinas, Inc., is not a party to the contract.
It did not consent to have this issue decided by an arbitrator
rather than by a court of competent jurisdiction. Appellant
is, in effect, urging the patently absurd proposition that. two
parties can by contract effectively stipulate for the mode of
determination of the rights of a third party who has not
only not assented to such a mode of determination but who
also is not even accorded an opportunity to participate in
such determination." (173 Cal.App.2d at p. 703.)
Local 770 attempts to distinguish the Bloom case on the
ground that it involved a suit to compel arbitration, whereas
in the present case Local 770 and Thriftimart agreed to sub·
mit the ~ssue of arbitrability to the arbitrator in the first instance. J\[ORE, howeve-r, did not agree to that submission,
and it is therefore not bound by it.
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed to
vacate ,the award pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 1286.2, subdivision (d).
- Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner,
J., and Peek, J., concurred.
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